The GuZi Economy: A Hundred-Billion Track of Emotional Value and a Brand Playbook

The GuZi economy is not a passing fad but a structural consumption migration. When a market of 168.9 billion yuan expands at over 40% annual growth, when the emotional consumption of 500 million pan-ACG consumers begins to reshape the language of retail space, and when domestic IP online popularity surpasses foreign IP by 26.7 percentage points for the first time — what we see is not simply 'ACG going mainstream,' but a signal that the emotional-value economy is moving from subcultural margins to the main stage of consumption. But the flip side of prosperity is equally stark: over 155 GuZi stores closed in the first half of 2025, more than 180 brands shuttered 15,000-plus locations in a single year, and a scarce trading card listed at 188,800 yuan on the secondary market drew 'pseudo-gambling' regulatory scrutiny. Making money in this track is far harder than it looks; who profits depends on whether they understand the underlying logic of ita-culture.

Market and Landscape

First, the scale. iiMedia Research data shows China's GuZi economy reached approximately 168.9 billion yuan in 2024, up 40.63% year-on-year, projected to reach 308.9 billion yuan by 2029; QuestMobile expects the total derivative merchandise market to exceed 240 billion yuan in 2025. Zooming out to the broader ACG peripheral ecosystem: about 298.3 billion yuan in 2019, approaching 600 billion yuan in 2024, nearly doubling in five years. Even more critical is the user base: core ACG users number nearly 100 million, pan-ACG users exceed 500 million, but actual purchasing users are only about 12.36 million — penetration remains extremely low, and the growth ceiling is far from being reached.

Next, the structure. The most defining feature of this track is 'IP-driven plus fragmented channels': the Matthew effect of top IPs (LABUBU, Ne Zha, Sanrio, etc.) is far stronger than brand concentration, while the retail end is extremely fragmented, with numerous long-tail SMEs and individual studios. No public CR3/CR5 data exists, and no single brand holds a dominant share. Players fall roughly into four categories: IP operators and trading-card leaders led by Kayou (10.057 billion yuan revenue in 2024, two attempts at a Hong Kong IPO); designer-toy IP brands like Pop Mart, TOP TOY, and 52TOYS; mass-retail cross-sector players like MINISO (49-100 yuan unit price, 1,000-plus SKUs, thousands of stores); and niche ita-bag brands like WEGO, Berry Q, and WINK OUV. Price bands span from 9.9-yuan entry-level merchandise to 3,000-plus yuan gold IP pendants, but the true high-margin zone lies not in manufacturing but in IP licensing and scarcity design.

The tension in the landscape lies in 'low visible barriers, high hidden thresholds.' Basic GuZi products are small, lightweight, and cheap to produce, attracting a flood of entrepreneurs; but quality IP acquisition and incubation, site selection, product curation, private-domain traffic operations, and inventory management — these are the real moats. The 2025 store-closure wave marks the end of the 'easy-money era': severe homogenization, expiring rent subsidies, declining Japanese manga IP search volumes alongside rising Chinese animation IPs have shifted the competitive focus from channel grabbing to IP originality and full-chain operations.

Brand Development Paths and Cases

GuZi economy brand development shows a clear three-tier stratification.

The first tier consists of IP licensing-driven trading-card giants. Kayou is the archetype — it launched with nationally recognized IP-licensed cards like Ultraman and My Little Pony, achieved 10.057 billion yuan in total revenue and 4.466 billion yuan in adjusted net profit in 2024, with card business revenue of 8.2 billion yuan and gross margins above 70%, holding 70 licensed and proprietary IPs. Its channel moat: over 90% of revenue comes from agent stores near school campuses. But the risks are equally prominent: 768 million yuan in royalty payments in 2024, nearly 90% non-exclusive IPs, and uncertain contract renewals; scarce cards listed at 188,800 yuan on secondary platforms, accused of 'pseudo-gambling mechanics,' facing minor-consumer compliance pressure. Kayou's second Hong Kong IPO filing will test the ceiling of the 'IP licensing plus card blind-box' model.

The second tier comprises mid-tier challengers pursuing domestic IP plus full-category expansion. Jason Entertainment, founded in Guangzhou in 2019, started with collectible cards, surpassed 100 million yuan in sales in 2021, approached 1 billion yuan in revenue in 2025, with a single domestic anime film card set breaking 100 million yuan in a week. Its core strategy: reduce single-category dependence — card revenue share projected to drop from 85% to under 50%, expanding into figures, plush, GuZi, and TCG. The financing path is equally clear: Bilibili angel round in 2022, two strategic rounds in 2025 with investors including 37 Interactive Entertainment and Hengdian Capital, preferring partners with tourism or IP resources for synergy.

The third tier is the long-tail, fragmented market for ita-bags, ita-clothing, and GuZi display props. This segment is dominated by small Taobao sellers with no dominant brand, relying on Xiaohongshu UGC 'showcasing GuZi' and 'GuZi aesthetics' tutorials to drive conversion. Xianyu sold 250,000 ita-bags in a year, with 90% of trading users being female and over 48% of buyers purchasing additional customization services — these two figures reveal the fundamental nature of ita-culture consumption: female dominance and customization premium. But offline GuZi store chains have undergone severe shakeouts, with 180-plus brands closing 15,000-plus stores in a year, survivors concentrating toward mall-anchored retail.

The shared pattern across all three paths is worth distilling: enter with high-frequency trading cards or badges, bind IP licenses, extend to full categories, run online e-commerce and offline mall stores or pop-ups in parallel, with leading players pursuing IPOs and mid-tier players bringing in industrial capital. The difference lies in IP strategy depth — Kayou relies on external licensing but has the largest scale, Jason Entertainment deeply binds domestic anime IPs for differentiation, and long-tail players survive in niches through content seeding and customization services.

Consumers and Trends

The GuZi economy consumer profile is highly concentrated: core demographic under 24 accounts for 57.5%, ages 25-30 account for 13.6%, predominantly female, with emotional projection as the primary purchase motivation — virtual idols and characters provide stable emotional connection, not functional utility. This is fundamentally different from traditional consumer goods logic: users are not buying an acrylic stand or an ita-bag, but a relationship with a virtual character, a confirmation of subcultural identity, and a sense of belonging within a community.

Four core needs form the underlying structure of consumption motivation: emotional comfort (virtual idols providing emotional connection), spiritual satisfaction (handcraft assembly and display aesthetics), subcultural identity (recognizing kindred spirits through ita-bags and ita-clothing), and novelty-seeking stimulation (collecting and speculating on rare items). The decision pathway follows a standard four-stage model: Xiaohongshu or Douyin seeding, community validation (Bilibili or QQ groups), e-commerce or official mini-program purchase, and secondary market circulation. Notably, KOC (ordinary users sharing ita-bag styling and display cabinet layouts) seeding efficiency significantly exceeds brand-official content — meaning brands need to 'yield' to users in content strategy rather than top-down broadcasting.

On trend signals, opportunities and risks coexist. Opportunities: domestic IP online attention reaches 55.1%, surpassing imported IP, with creations like Langlangshan Little Demon topping attention charts, giving the 'national GuZi' ecosystem sustained content supply capability; GuZi consumption merging with cultural tourism and commercial districts is activating urban consumption scenes, with leading companies' derivative transaction value exceeding 1.1 billion yuan in 2025 with year-on-year doubling; AI-generated custom patterns and small-batch printing technology are lowering barriers, rapidly expanding personalized ita-clothing and home peripheral supply. Risks: some IPs are treated as short-term monetization tools lacking long-term content ecosystems, making user stickiness fragile; AI-generated derivative IP boundaries remain legally undefined; cross-border sourcing channel disruptions and refund disputes are frequent; secondary market average price declines suggest price bubbles in certain categories.

Methodology

Based on the above analysis, I distill an 'IP-Product-Place-People' four-dimensional brand strategy framework for new and existing players in the GuZi economy.

Dimension One: IP Anchoring — From 'borrowing IP' to 'nurturing IP.' The essence of the GuZi economy is the IP economy, but 'borrowing IP' and 'nurturing IP' are fundamentally different strategies. Kayou paid 768 million yuan in royalties in 2024 with nearly 90% non-exclusive IPs — this is the cost of the 'borrowing' model: large scale but thin moats, high renewal risk. The correct path: use licensed IPs short-term for cash flow and user base, deeply bind domestic animation and game IPs mid-term for differentiation (as Jason Entertainment does), and cultivate proprietary IPs or participate in IP co-creation long-term, transitioning from copyright buyer to IP ecosystem co-builder. Principle: IP licensing is the entry ticket; IP incubation is the moat.

Dimension Two: Category Ladder — High-frequency entry, progressive extension. Trading cards and badges are high-frequency, strongly IP-bound entry categories, but single-category dependence is a structural risk. Jason Entertainment's strategy of reducing card revenue share from 85% to under 50% is instructive. The actionable path: use cards and badges to build user stickiness and IP recognition, extend to plush and figures and other emotionally premium categories, then penetrate ita-bags, display props, IP co-branded home goods and other lifestyle categories, forming a category pyramid of 'high-frequency low-price for traffic, mid-frequency mid-price for profit, low-frequency high-price for brand building.' Principle: each category must have an independent emotional-value proposition, not just a simple licensing sticker.

Dimension Three: Place Construction — A three-element channel system. 'Online seeding plus offline immersion plus secondary circulation' is not three independent channels but an organic loop. Online, Xiaohongshu is the core seeding platform, prioritizing KOC and UGC over brand-official content — 48% of Xianyu ita-bag buyers purchasing customization services shows users want participation, not finished products. Offline, upgrade from 'opening stores' to 'creating scenes': the core function of themed stores and pop-ups is not selling goods but providing immersive settings for photo-taking and community gatherings. Secondary circulation is a necessary part of ita-culture consumption — Xianyu's 2024 GMV grew 104% year-on-year, and brands should proactively design circulation-friendly product mechanisms (numbered limited editions, splittable sets) rather than treating the secondary market as a threat. Principle: channels are amplifiers of emotional value, not extensions of shelves.

Dimension Four: User Management — Emotion as core, community as wing. GuZi consumers buy relationships, not products, so the focus of user management should shift from 'repurchase rate' to 'emotional engagement.' Specific steps: build continuous emotional connection between IP characters and users (character birthdays, plot updates, limited commemorations), establish community recognition mechanisms (ita-bags and ita-clothing as subcultural identifiers), design co-creation entry points (customization services, UGC collection, GuZi aesthetics tutorials), and manage expectations and scarcity (avoiding over-speculation that damages reputation). Principle: beware the 'pseudo-gambling' trap — scarcity design should serve collecting value, not speculative demand, or it will invite regulatory intervention and user attrition.

Fifth Cross-Cutting Principle: Long-termism over short-term monetization. The 2025 store closures and secondary price declines have proven: growth driven by channel dividends and IP speculation is unsustainable. Brands need to answer one fundamental question — are you selling GuZi, or operating an IP-driven emotional consumption ecosystem? The former is a business; the latter is a brand. Kayou's IPO journey, Jason Entertainment's full-category transformation, and the customization premium in the Xianyu ita-bag segment are all, in essence, answering this question.

Conclusion and Judgment

The GuZi economy is in the early-to-mid growth stage: a hundred-billion-level market, 40%+ growth, 500 million pan-ACG users but consumption penetration still low — this is a track with high certainty and a distant ceiling. But certainty does not mean gold everywhere. 155 store closures in half a year, 180-plus brands closing 15,000-plus locations in a year, secondary market average price declines — these signals indicate that the extensive-growth dividend period has ended, and the industry has entered a 'competing on IP originality, full-chain operations, and product curation' intensive phase.

For practitioners, there are three core judgments. First, the rise of domestic IP is an irreversible trend (online attention at 55.1%, already exceeding imported IP), and brands that deeply bind with domestic-creation IP will reap structural dividends. Second, ita-bags, display props, co-branded home goods and other lifestyle categories are the next growth wave, but supply is currently fragmented and standardization is low — whoever establishes quality standards and brand awareness first will claim the position. Third, AI customization and scene fusion are the most certain opportunity signals within 12-24 months, but the undefined IP boundaries of AI derivatives and supply chain fragility are risks that need to be hedged in advance.

The endgame of the GuZi economy will not be an oligopoly of a few dominant brands, but more likely a pyramid structure of 'top-tier IP ecosystems plus mid-tier category brands plus long-tail custom creators.' In this structure, the real winners are not the fastest runners, but those who best understand the economics of emotional value.